Empathy, Acceptance of Responsibility, and Compelled Testimony in Juvenile Transfer Hearings: Legal Context and Empirical Evidence by Heilbrun, Kirk et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association American Judges Association 
2014 
Empathy, Acceptance of Responsibility, and Compelled Testimony 
in Juvenile Transfer Hearings: Legal Context and Empirical 
Evidence 
Kirk Heilbrun 
Drexel University, kh33@drexel.edu 
Sanjay Shah 
Emory University, sanjayshah01@gmail.com 
Elizabeth Foster 
Drexel University, elizabeth.e.foster@gmail.com 
Michael Keesler 
Drexel University, mekeesler@gmail.com 
Stephanie Brooks Holliday 
sfbrooks@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview 
Heilbrun, Kirk; Shah, Sanjay; Foster, Elizabeth; Keesler, Michael; and Holliday, Stephanie Brooks, "Empathy, 
Acceptance of Responsibility, and Compelled Testimony in Juvenile Transfer Hearings: Legal Context and 
Empirical Evidence" (2014). Court Review: The Journal of the American Judges Association. 468. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/468 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal of 
the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - 
Lincoln. 
Footnotes
1. E.g., GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND
LAWYERS 471–73 (3d ed. 2007). 
2. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355 (2000).
3. Id.
4. Commonwealth v. Brown, 2011 PA Super. 47 (2011).
5. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). 
There are a number of legal decisions in which the courtmust decide whether juveniles can be rehabilitated. Suchdecisions include juvenile adjudication/placement, waiver,
and reverse waiver.1 The criterion used by courts to consider
rehabilitation amenability is typically phrased in a way similar
to that described under Pennsylvania state law.2 In deciding
whether a child may be decertified (reverse waived from crimi-
nal to juvenile court), the court can consider
whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervi-
sion, or rehabilitation as a juvenile. The court may con-
sider the following in determining treatment, supervi-
sion, or rehabilitation amenability: (a) age, (b) mental
capacity, (c) maturity, (d) degree of criminal sophistica-
tion, (e) previous records, (f) nature and extent of any
prior delinquent history, including the success or failure
of any previous attempts by the juvenile court to reha-
bilitate, (g) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior
to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction, (h)
probation or institutional reports, (i) any other relevant
factors, and (j) whether there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the child is not committable to an institution
for the mentally retarded or mentally ill.3
Empathy for the victims of the defendant’s offenses, and
acceptance of responsibility for such offenses, may be consid-
ered by mental health and justice professionals working with
post-adjudicated youth. But rendering an expert opinion that
describes the youth’s capacity for empathy or acceptance of
responsibility, when that opinion is based in part on questions
concerning the alleged offense, places the evaluating expert in
an awkward position. To what extent can denial of culpability
be used to infer limited empathy and acceptance of responsibil-
ity? How does the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation factor into this consideration?
Some courts have addressed these questions, at least in part.
In a recent Pennsylvania decertification case,4 the defendant,
facing potential adjudication in criminal court, was 11 years old
when charged with shooting and killing his stepmother and her
unborn child. The trial court denied a defense motion to decer-
tify the case to the juvenile division, and defense counsel
appealed. 
In the appeal, defense contended that the trial court com-
mitted an error of law in applying a provision of the decertifi-
cation statute5 in a manner that infringed upon the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In particular,
the psychiatrist retained by the Commonwealth testified that
the youth avoided talking about the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing and the factual allegations. The psychiatrist
added that such avoidance of taking responsibility complicated
rehabilitation, as taking responsibility is a necessary precursor
to effective rehabilitation. Thus, he concluded, Jordan Brown
could not be rehabilitated. 
The trial court decided that the defendant could not be reha-
bilitated by the age of 21, citing the expert’s reasoning that the
defendant would not take responsibility for his actions—and
thus concluding that rehabilitation was unlikely to be success-
ful. On appeal, however, the appellate court held that the Fifth
Amendment applies in decertification proceedings. The appel-
late court vacated the trial court’s order, remanding the case for
a new decertification hearing. In the subsequent trial court
hearing, without the evidence offered initially by the Common-
wealth’s expert, the court concluded that Jordan Brown should
be decertified. 
This Pennsylvania case offers some precedent for legal pro-
ceedings in which a juvenile defendant’s rehabilitation
amenability is at issue. This article will address two questions:
(1) To what extent does the Fifth Amendment provide protec-
tion from compelled testimony at transfer hearings? and (2)
What does the relevant behavioral science evidence suggest
concerning the appraisal of a defendant’s capacity for empathy
and acceptance of responsibility—and to what extent is such an
appraisal limited when a mental health expert cannot question
the defendant about his/her role in the alleged offense?
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FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF JUVENILES 
FROM COMPELLED TESTIMONY AT TRANSFER HEARINGS
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court established that
the Fifth Amendment is broadly applicable to juvenile transfer
hearings.6 Since that time, some states have more specifically
addressed the application of the Fifth Amendment in juvenile
transfer hearings with respect to compelled testimony in such
hearings. This section will describe jurisdictions in which (a)
compelled, self-incriminating testimony is disallowed; (b) such
testimony is permitted; and (c) relevant law does not clearly
support either (a) or (b). Whenever possible, we focus particu-
larly on the use of such testimony to the question of amenabil-
ity to rehabilitation rather than other questions (e.g., risk of
future offending) that often arise in transfer proceedings.
JURISDICTIONS DISALLOWING COMPELLED SELF-
INCRIMINATING TESTIMONY
Alaska. In R.H. v. State7 the court compelled the juvenile to
submit to a psychiatric evaluation and substance abuse screen-
ing. Therein, the court sought to avoid the risk of self-incrimi-
nation by allowing the defendant’s attorney to be present, to
screen the report first, and to limit the use of the report beyond
the waiver hearing. During the stage of the transfer hearing
devoted to determining the juvenile’s treatment amenability, the
State presented testimony from three experts who had exam-
ined the defendant “(t)o establish the probable cause of R.H.’s
delinquent behavior and the adequacy of existing facilities to
provide treatment to R.H. . . .”8 However, the juvenile did not
introduce psychiatric evidence on his own behalf.
On appeal, the defendant claimed infringement on his right
to be free from self-incrimination. The State argued that R.H.
was protected because “the court restricted the use of the eval-
uations to the determination of R.H.’s amenability to treatment
and precluded their use in subsequent phases of his case. . . .”9
In its ruling, the court noted that “the stakes involved in such
proceedings are high”10 and that the transfer hearing is an
adversarial process. The court concluded that this compelled
evaluation helped the state to incriminate the defendant, citing
Estelle v. Smith as authority that “the fifth amendment privilege
is not confined to directly inculpatory statements or to any par-
ticular type of proceeding.”11 The court explained that the pros-
ecution’s report helped the court decide to prosecute R.H. as an
adult—and, as a result, he faced much more serious punish-
ment.12 However, the court also noted that had the juvenile pre-
sented psychiatric evidence on his own behalf, this may constitute
a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.13 Ultimately, the court
held that “the erroneously
admitted evidence did not have
an appreciable effect on the
court’s ultimate decision to waive
jurisdiction,”14 vacating the orig-
inal order and remanding the
case for reconsideration.
Arizona. In one Arizona case
in which a juvenile was charged
with first-degree murder, the
state requested a mental health
evaluation. The defense opposed
this request because any incriminating statements could be
used in both the transfer hearing and in any subsequent pro-
ceedings (including on the issue of guilt).15 The court ordered
the examination but stated that “the decision whether to sub-
mit to [the evaluation] was up to the appellant. No limitation
as ordered on the use of the results of the examination.”16 Addi-
tionally, the court made clear that it intended to use the juve-
nile’s decision regarding participation in the evaluation when
determining his treatment amenability.17 The appellate court
found the juvenile’s refusal formed a foundation for the lower
court’s determination of non-amenability, adding that this issue
could be avoided by “placing appropriate limitations on the use
of appellant’s statements in the court’s order granting the
request for a mental examination.”18 However, by not limiting
the use of the evaluation and then “penalizing the appellant for
refusing to cooperate,”19 the process violated the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment rights.20
California. In Ramona R. v. Superior Court,21 the California
Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a juvenile defendant,
charged with murder, had been held by the trial court as “unfit
to be tried in juvenile court” due to the “gravity of her offense”
and low treatment amenability.22 After granting appeal, the
Supreme Court of California considered whether section 707(c)
of the California Welfare and Institutions Code was unconsti-
tutional.23 The issue was that it appeared to compel a minor to
choose between the due-process right to testify and privilege
against self-incrimination.24
In its decision, the Supreme Court of California observed
that use immunities are important to protect against self-
incrimination and that “testimony a minor gives at a fitness
hearing or statements he makes to his probation officer may not
be used against him at a subsequent trial of the offense.”25
According to the court, the defendant should have had “protec-
tion against the use at trial of any statements she may make to
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her probation officer or to the
court at her fitness hearing.”26
Noting that transfer to criminal
court is “the worst punishment
the juvenile system is empow-
ered to inflict,” the court
described this as a cruel
“trilemma” in which the defen-
dant was forced to choose
between (1) making a case for
herself, but potentially having
those statements used against
her; (2) risking that invoking the
Fifth Amendment would be seen
as an indication that there are no reasons the juvenile should
not be tried in criminal court; and (3) giving altogether false
testimony.27
The court concluded that such a cruel “trilemma” was not an
appropriate set of choices.28 Because the court found that the
immunity required by California law was violated, the question
of whether it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proving
fitness for juvenile court treatment on the minor was not
addressed.29
Colorado. In People in Interest of A.D.G., the Colorado Court
of Appeals reviewed a case in which a juvenile had been
charged with manslaughter and use of a weapon.30 In most of
the cases reviewed in this article, transfer appeals are filed by
the defense after a juvenile has been transferred to criminal
court. In this case, however, the lower court denied the prose-
cution’s motion to transfer the case to criminal court, retaining
the defendant in juvenile court.31 Thus, it was the prosecution’s
appeal that was addressed in People in Interest of A.D.G.32
In the original case, the prosecution sought a psychological
evaluation of the juvenile when it requested the case be trans-
ferred to criminal court.33 The juvenile court “concluded that it
could not order a psychological examination over the juvenile’s
objection”34 and that a juvenile could not be “compelled to sub-
mit to an evaluation because of his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.”35 On review, the Colorado Court of
Appeals agreed, holding that a juvenile cannot be compelled to
participate in an evaluation under these circumstances.36
Concluding that the trial court was correct in its decision not
to compel the evaluation, the appellate court reasoned that the
Fifth Amendment clearly applies to transfer hearings because
(1) they are “‘plainly adverse’”37 to the juvenile, and (2) the
juvenile risks loss of rehabilitation and is instead subject to
adult penalties.38 Finally, the court held that the juvenile’s
refusal to be examined by a psychologist could not be consid-
ered as part of a transfer decision because a “defendant may not
be penalized for the exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent.”39
People in Interest of A.D.G., however, was later distinguished
by People in Interest of C.Y.40 In this case, the magistrate ordered
a psychosexual evaluation as part of a risk management plan
after C.Y. was found incompetent to stand trial and could not
be restored.41 The court held that the magistrate’s order did not
violate C.Y.’s right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
reasoning that the case did not involve a transfer hearing but
instead concerned “the ‘neutral’ issue of competency.”42 Fur-
ther, the court concluded that any statements made during the
evaluation would be obtained during treatment related to
incompetency, and the juvenile would receive statutory immu-
nity.43
Kansas. In State v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Kansas con-
sidered whether consent to a psychological evaluation pursuant
to a transfer hearing was objectionable when Miranda rights
had not been read beforehand.44 In the original trial, the juve-
nile defendant had been convicted of first-degree felony murder
and related offenses.45 Therein, the prosecution had not tried to
admit self-incriminating statements at trial—rather, such state-
ments were used only as part of the evaluation.46 The trial court
insisted that it would not consider any statements about the
alleged offense that may establish guilt but would rather use
other information in the report.47 Upon conviction, the juvenile
defendant appealed on a number of grounds, including the cir-
cumstances surrounding the court-ordered psychological eval-
uation.48
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that a juve-
nile’s declining to participate in the court-ordered evaluation
may not be admitted as evidence against the juvenile.49 Under
these circumstances, in Kansas, there appears to be two levels
of protection against compelled self-incriminating statements:
they are not admissible on the issue of guilt, and the defendant
may decline participation in a court-ordered evaluation on Fifth
Amendment grounds without risking adverse consequences.
Massachusetts. In Commonwealth v. Wayne W., the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed a case wherein two
juvenile defendants were transferred to criminal court.50 The
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defendants appealed on the basis of the Juvenile Court’s exclu-
sion of their expert psychiatric witnesses, who would have tes-
tified regarding their “amenability to rehabilitation within the
juvenile justice system.”51 The judge excluded the experts,
however, because the juveniles had refused to participate in an
evaluation with the prosecution’s psychiatric expert.52 They
asserted that being evaluated by the prosecution’s expert would
violate their right against self-incrimination.53
Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that Fifth Amendment protection applies in transfer hearings
and related proceedings, it was careful to limit the scope of that
protection.54 The court stated that when defendants “voluntar-
ily choose to offer expert psychiatric evidence, [they] can be
ordered to participate in an examination by a Commonwealth
expert.”55 The court also noted that “a defendant who speaks
on his own behalf thereby gives up his privilege of silence and
may be compelled to respond to questions posed by the State on
matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his own tes-
timony.”56 Thus, the court upheld the lower court’s transfer
decision but explained that its ruling could have been different
had the juveniles not sought to introduce their own expert psy-
chiatric testimony.57
Minnesota. The Minnesota appellate court has held that, for
purposes of certification, a “juvenile is presumed guilty of the
alleged offenses.”58 For presumptive-certification proceedings,
the State must demonstrate that the juvenile “was 16 or 17
years old at the time of the offense” and that “the alleged
offense carries a presumptive prison sentence.”59 At that point,
the juvenile may rebut the certification by demonstrating that
the juvenile system would better serve public safety if the case
were not transferred. In the case In re Welfare of S.J.T., defense
contended that (1) “Minnesota certification procedure violates
the Fifth Amendment by requiring the juvenile to rebut a pre-
sumption of certification,” and (2) “the Fifth Amendment pre-
cludes the district court from compelling the juvenile to submit
certain information to the state.”60 The appellant had retained
his own expert but refused to meet with the state’s expert.61
Although he met with a probation officer conducting the certi-
fication study and agreed to provide access to medical records,
the juvenile then revoked this release of information.62
On review, the appellate court found that although certifica-
tion proceedings are “not a dispositional procedure,” the Fifth
Amendment “applies to all proceedings.”63 The court also held
that although the presumptive certification proceedings offer
the juvenile the opportunity to
testify and rebut, “he is not
required to do so”64—therefore,
the statute does not compel him
to testify and thus violate the
Fifth Amendment. The appel-
lant had argued that his Fifth
Amendment rights were vio-
lated when he was compelled to
“produce certain records . . .
without protection to the defen-
dant for any incriminating
statements that those records
may contain.”65 However, the
court concluded that because the records were compelled, “the
information provided is therefore immune from use in appel-
lant’s criminal proceeding.”66 The appellate court ultimately
concluded that the Fifth Amendment does apply to certification
and further observed that applicable state statutes protect
against the use of any evidence or source of evidence used in a
certification study from use in later trials.67
Nevada. The Supreme Court of Nevada heard consolidated
appeals from two juveniles certified as adults.68 In the first case,
William M. was charged with “conspiracy to commit robbery,
burglary while in possession of a firearm, and robbery with the
use of a deadly weapon.”69 The State sought to have him certi-
fied as an adult, submitting the court psychologists’ evaluation
and a certification report written by the juvenile’s probation
officer, both detailing the defendant’s alcohol abuse.70 During
the certification hearing, defense counsel explained that
although there was evidence regarding William’s substance
abuse, William was “unable to rebut the presumption of adult
certification by connecting his substance abuse problem to any
actions in the alleged robbery, as he denied being involved in
the incident.”71 The trial court responded that “even though
William had clearly established an alcohol abuse problem, he
had not established a direct nexus between his alcohol abuse
and the alleged conduct,” thus certifying him to criminal
court.72
In the second case, the State again sought to transfer a juve-
nile with robbery and firearms charges to criminal court.73 The
psychological evaluation in the second case described sub-
stance abuse as well as behavioral and emotional problems, but
the juvenile again denied participation in the offense.74 The trial
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court found that because he could
not establish “a nexus between
his substance abuse or his emo-
tional and behavioral issues and
the park robbery, as he denies any
involvement in the robbery,”75 the
court certified him to criminal
court. 
In the consolidated appeal, the
defense argued that requiring
juveniles to admit guilt “to rebut
the presumption of adult certification” while “failing to prohibit
the admission of their incriminating statement in subsequent
guilt-determination proceedings”76 violated their Fifth Amend-
ment rights. The appellate court agreed, holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “applies to
inculpatory statements made in juvenile proceedings.”77 The
court reasoned that requiring juveniles to “establish a direct
nexus” between their problems and the criminal conduct forces
them to provide inculpatory evidence to rebut the certification
presumption.78 Because there was no prohibition against using
these statements in subsequent proceedings, the appellate court
held that “Nevada’s presumption certification provisions . . .
violate the Fifth Amendment and therefore are unconstitu-
tional.”79
New Mexico. In a recent New Mexico case, a juvenile
(Christopher P.) was charged with two counts of first-degree
murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.80 At a
second (amenability) stage of the transfer hearing, the chil-
dren’s court judge ordered the defendant to submit to a mental
health evaluation to help determine his rehabilitation amenabil-
ity.81 Although the juvenile’s counsel objected, the court
“ordered the child to discuss the alleged delinquent acts with
the psychologist conducting the evaluation”82 and also ordered
that the information about the alleged offenses could be used
only for the amenability portion of the transfer hearing.83 The
youth was transferred to criminal court and appealed on
numerous grounds, including Fifth Amendment infringement
“when the children’s court ordered him to discuss the alleged
crimes during the psychological evaluation.”84
On review, the Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the
transfer, overriding the trial and appellate courts.85 The court
found that Fifth Amendment rights of the child were violated
when he was made to discuss the charges, though the court also
held that ordering a mental health evaluation was not beyond
the authority of the trial court.86
Oklahoma. In J.T.P. v. State, a juvenile was arrested on mur-
der charges and a petition was filed for transfer to criminal
court.87 After his arrest, the juvenile was questioned, with his
father present for some of the questioning.88 However, it could
not be determined whether the father knew his son was in cus-
tody or whether the juvenile ever attempted to assert or waive
his constitutional rights.89 The juvenile was subsequently trans-
ferred to Arkansas for a polygraph test; the father provided per-
mission, and the juvenile was informed of his Miranda rights.90
The polygraph was administered by a police captain, who was
alone in the room with the juvenile, and the juvenile confessed
to his part in the murder after the polygraph was adminis-
tered.91 In the trial, the juvenile was transferred to criminal
court.92
On appeal, the defense contended that this confession was in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.93 The appellate court
agreed and further held that the juvenile court must exclude cer-
tification evidence involving “statements of a child, obtained in
violation of constitutional or statutory rights” that are inadmis-
sible in delinquency or criminal proceedings.94 In the case at
hand, the court determined that the statement resulting from the
interrogation should not be admitted.95 Thereafter, the court saw
insufficient evidence that the juvenile could not be rehabilitated
(although those two were not necessarily linked).96
JURISDICTIONS ALLOWING COMPELLED SELF-
INCRIMINATING TESTIMONY
Alabama. The 14-year-old juvenile in Lippold v. State was
charged with murder, but because of his age, the circuit court
heard a motion for transfer to juvenile court.97 This motion was
unsuccessful, and the defendant was tried and convicted in
adult criminal court.98 In the transfer hearing, the prosecution
presented a psychologist’s testimony regarding a court-ordered
evaluation.99 Although the psychologist provided notification
to the juvenile, he was not sure whether the defendant fully
understood the potential implications.100 There was no coun-
selor or parent present, and the defendant described facts relat-
ing to the offense.101 Based largely on the evaluation, the defen-
dant was tried in the circuit court as an adult.102
On review of this decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Alabama observed that “[h]ad the State of Alabama endeavored
to use the statement made to Dr. Bitgood as substantive evi-
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dence . . . we would not hesitate to reverse and remand this
cause for a new trial.”103 However, the State “did not use Lip-
pold’s inculpatory statements to Dr. Bitgood as evidence at
trial.”104 Instead, they were used only in the transfer hearing,
and the appellate court determined that this situation had been
“properly handled by the Circuit Court.”105
Arkansas. In a 2004 case, a 14-year-old juvenile charged
with murder was considered for reverse transfer into juvenile
court.106 Testimony was provided from multiple sources,
including his paternal grandmother, a DHS supervisor, a social
worker, a teacher from juvenile detention, a Youth Services
Center facility director, a child and adolescent psychiatrist
(who testified about the defendant’s prior hospitalizations), a
Division of Youth Services case manager, and an Arkansas Pub-
lic Defender Commission investigator (who had met with the
juvenile).107 The prosecution also proffered testimony from a
state police special agent and a mental health professional who
had evaluated the defendant for competence to stand trial.108
Appealing the decision to try the juvenile defendant in crim-
inal court, defense argued that the defendant’s Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination was violated because he
“was forced to incriminate himself at a transfer hearing.”109 The
prosecution contended—and the Supreme Court of Arkansas
agreed—that the statute did not compel the juvenile to testify
and that he did not actually “testify” at the hearing.110 By this
line of reasoning, therefore, the Fifth Amendment does not
seem to prevent Arkansas prosecution from presenting inculpa-
tory evaluation evidence at a transfer hearing.
Louisiana. In State in the Interest of Bruno, the juvenile
defendant was charged with second-degree murder, and the
State sought transfer to criminal court.111 Pursuant to that
motion, the prosecution sought to have the juvenile submit to
a “psychiatric and psychological examination . . . for the pur-
pose of evaluating the child’s ‘amenability’ to the juvenile sys-
tem.”112 Although defense objected, the trial court held that the
applicable state statute did “not prevent a judge from ordering
a child in a juvenile transfer proceeding to undergo a psycho-
logical evaluation.”113 As the court explained, a juvenile trans-
fer requires “a full-blown hearing at which the child has a right
to an attorney, and which involves the presentation of evidence
by both the child and the state.”114
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that a
juvenile undergoing such an evaluation is entitled to Fifth
Amendment protections.115 In
this case, though, the court
explained that the evaluation
was not used to determine guilt
but rather to simply address the
question of amenability to
treatment.116 As a result, “it
does not violate the child’s
right not to be compelled to
give evidence against him-
self.”117 The court also noted,
however, that “no statements,
either inculpatory or exculpa-
tory, made to the psychologist
or psychiatrist during the examination, would be admissible at
the trial on the merits of the child’s guilt or innocence.”118
Michigan. In 1993, the Supreme Court of Michigan granted
an appeal after a juvenile, charged with possession and delivery
of a substance containing cocaine and related charges, was
waived for trial in adult criminal court.119 In the hearing, the
defendant offered character testimony and his own psycholo-
gist.120 However, the juvenile was waived following testimony
from the probate court psychologist and the arresting police
officers.121 The juvenile appealed this transfer and the appellate
court reversed, holding that “the constitutional rights applica-
ble in criminal proceedings extended to . . . the dispositional
phase of a waiver hearing.”122 The Michigan Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court, however, holding that the consti-
tutional rights did not extend to the dispositional phase of a
wavier hearing because the best interests of the juveniles and
the public are taken under consideration.123
Texas. In K.W.M. v. State, the 14th District Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas reviewed a case wherein a juvenile, charged
with aggravated robbery at age 16, appealed his discretionary
transfer to criminal court.124 In the state’s petition for transfer,
the prosecution submitted a written confession and diagnostic
report/evaluation as evidence.125 Although the defense objected
to these documents’ admission, the court overruled the objec-
tion, and the case was ultimately transferred to the adult sys-
tem.126
The juvenile appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the psycho-
logical report and evaluation—neither requested nor consented
to by him or his attorney—should not have been admitted.127
The Michigan
Supreme Court
[held] 
constitutional
rights did not
extend to the 
dispositional
phase of a
wavier hearing
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The court stated that the Texas
Code requires that “prior to
the hearing, the juvenile court
shall order and obtain a com-
plete diagnostic study, social
evaluation, and full investiga-
tion of the child, his circum-
stances, and the circumstances
of the alleged offense.”128 Defense countered that this violates
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.129 The
Court of Civil Appeals, however, described the transfer hearing
as “not an adjudication of the child’s guilt or innocence” and
concluded, therefore, that Fifth Amendment rights did not
apply.130 Interestingly, the court also noted that the code “does
not require the court to order the child to discuss his or her
involvement in the alleged crime with the examiner but merely
‘the circumstances of the alleged offense.’”131 Therefore, a juve-
nile is not coerced to make self-incriminating statements, and
his “Fifth Amendment rights are in no way jeopardized” (even
if they did apply).132
Washington. The juvenile in In re Hegney was charged with
felony murder, tried as an adult, and convicted.133 He appealed
the decision, but the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division
2, affirmed the decision.134 The defense filed a personal
restraint petition, arguing that Washington’s juvenile declina-
tion procedure (i.e., a court declining to transfer a juvenile pre-
sumptively tried as an adult to juvenile court) violated his Fifth
Amendment rights.135 The defense contended that the proce-
dure created a circumstance in which “evidence was admitted
at the decline hearing, and used against Mr. Hegney, that later
the same court determined to be inadmissible.”136 The appellate
court held, however, that a “decline hearing is not prosecutor-
ial in nature,” and guilt is not in question.137 They further stated
that “(t)he procedure itself cannot lead to a juvenile’s loss of lib-
erty” and that “even improperly obtained statements by the
police are admissible at a decline hearing, even though they
would not be admissible at a substantive trial.”138
JURISDICTIONS NEITHER ALLOWING NOR DISALLOW-
ING COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATING TESTIMONY
West Virginia. In State v. George Anthony W., two juveniles
were taken into custody as suspects in a murder, were ques-
tioned separately, and confessed.139 At the transfer hearing, the
juveniles moved to suppress the confessions and evidence, but
the court denied this motion and granted the state’s petition to
transfer the case to criminal court.140 The juveniles appealed,
arguing that the confession had been obtained in violation of
West Virginia law because of the “failure of the authorities to
present them to a judge or other appropriate party for a deten-
tion hearing prior to obtaining the statements.”141 The relevant
statute indicates that “[a] child in custody must immediately be
taken before a referee or judge of the circuit court and in no
event shall a delay exceed the next succeeding judicial 
day. . . .”142 In an earlier case, the court established that delay-
ing that appearance to obtain a confession violates this code.143
The appellate court, applying this “Ellsworth J.R. test,” found
that the appellants were held in custody “without being pre-
sented before a judicial officer.”144 The court further concluded
that the delay’s purpose was to obtain a confession and accord-
ingly held the confessions to be invalid. Because the transfer
decision was based on the invalid confessions, the transfer deci-
sion was reversed and remanded by the appellate court.145 This
decision neither clearly affirmed nor rejected the role of the
Fifth Amendment in juvenile transfer hearings; although the
trial court’s decision was reversed because of its use of an
“invalid confession,” the confession was invalid under the
Ellsworth J.R. timeliness test, not on Fifth Amendment
grounds.
EMPATHY, ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY, 
REHABILITATION AMENABILITY, AND REOFFENSE RISK 
Based on the above review, it appears that courts are divided
on whether the Fifth Amendment protects juveniles from com-
pelled confession during pre-adjudicative transfer hearings.
Some courts apply those confessions, or lack thereof, to inform
the question of whether the youth displays empathy for others
(including potential victims) and accepts responsibility for
what he or she has (allegedly) done. Courts favoring such com-
pelled confession suggest that the confession indicates empathy
and acceptance of responsibility. Those courts further assume
that juveniles who, by admission or confession, display empa-
thy and accept responsibility for the alleged offense will be
more amenable to rehabilitation efforts in the juvenile system. 
But how accurate is this suggestion? What does the relevant
behavioral science research indicate about the relationship
between empathy for victims, acceptance of responsibility, and
juvenile offending? More specifically, how do relevant evidence
and contemporary best practices suggest that risk and needs be
assessed in juveniles? Finally, and most specifically, what are
the roles of empathy and acceptance of responsibility in assess-
ing reoffense risk and risk-relevant needs—and does such
assessment require a discussion of the alleged offense? We focus
on these questions in this section. 
To facilitate this discussion, we will consider empathy and
acceptance of responsibility (AR) in the broader context of the
leading contemporary model describing risk and needs: the
Courts are 
divided on whether
confessions are
compellable at the
transfer stage.
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Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model.146 While empathy/AR
can influence the decision about the presence of some risk fac-
tors related to juvenile offending, there are other factors that
describe needs and affect risk as well.  
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EMPATHY, ACCEPTANCE OF
RESPONSIBILITY, AND JUVENILE OFFENDING
Normative development of empathy into adulthood has
been shown to relate to prosocial behavior.147 Conversely,
research has established a negative relationship between (1)
empathy and (2) aggression and antisocial behavior.148 One
meta-analysis found the empathetic/sympathetic index as mea-
sured by self-report questionnaires to be negatively related to
aggression and antisocial behavior.149 It should be noted, how-
ever, that only one study analyzed in this meta-analysis specifi-
cally involved criminal offending.150 Cohen and Strayer found
empathy was significantly lower in conduct-disordered youth
relative to a comparison group when participants viewed video-
taped vignettes.151 In addition, lower levels of empathy have
been related to an increased risk for engaging in interpersonal
violence and aggression.152 Exhibiting deficits in empathy may
fit in the broader context of developmentally delayed moral
judgment. A meta-analysis of 50 studies showed a lower stage
of moral judgment for juvenile delinquents.153 In addition,
lower levels of empathy in juveniles have been associated with
a lack of “moral judgment maturity” and self-serving cognitive
distortions.154
Empathy has commonly been divided into affective and cog-
nitive components. The affective component is the concordant
emotional response (i.e., sharing of emotional state) when
observing another’s emotional response.155 For example, affec-
tive empathy would include the capacity to feel sad when
observing someone else who is obviously sad. The cognitive
component involves understanding another’s emotional
state.156 Cognitive empathy, therefore, involves the capacity to
understand that another person who is obviously sad is feeling
that way—and to accurately label
this emotion as sadness. In a
meta-analysis of studies regarding
cognitive and affective empathy of
offending, low cognitive empathy
was strongly related to offending,
while low affective empathy was
more weakly related.157 In the
same study, the negative relation-
ship between empathy and
offending was stronger with violent offenders compared with
sexual offenders, meaning that violent offenders showed more
empathy deficits than did sexual offenders. Also, the relation-
ship between empathy and offending was stronger in adoles-
cents than in adults in this meta-analysis. Notably, however,
there was no relationship between empathy and offending after
taking into account socio-economic status and intelligence. In
other words, lower levels of empathy were more likely to be
seen in individuals of lower SES and more limited intellectual
functioning—and it might be that it was lower SES and lower
intelligence rather than empathy that were causally related to
offending. 
Additionally, in a group of juvenile sexual offenders, emo-
tional empathy was found to have a negative relationship with
non-sexual offenses. Within this same group of juveniles,
researchers concluded emotional empathy plays a role and
influences the relationship between offending and other factors.
For example, emotional empathy was found to moderate the
relationship between hostile masculinity and offending.158 It
seems clear empathy and offending cannot be viewed in isola-
tion but rather considered within the broader context of poten-
tially related factors.
Acceptance of responsibility has not been empirically stud-
ied in the same depth as empathy regarding its relationship to
aggression and offending. There is some research, however, on
how apologizing may relate to a reduction in future offending
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(the relationship between accep-
tance of responsibility and
apologies is discussed in the fol-
lowing section). In one study
conducted in New Zealand,
offending youths who did not
apologize were found to be three
times more likely to recidivate
than those who did.159 An apol-
ogy may contain a genuine ele-
ment of remorse or regret,160 but
it is certainly a formal expression of such. Another study exam-
ined the relationship between acceptance of responsibility and
engagement with the treatment process.161 The investigators
found that youths who accepted responsibility for their behav-
ior and thought there was a good reason for their placement
scored high on such scales as readiness to change and engage-
ment in treatment.162 In contrast, those who shifted responsi-
bility to others and felt there was not a good reason for the
placement scored lowest on the measures.163
Lack of remorse (e.g., feeling bad or guilty) can be viewed as
a component of “callous/unemotional (CU) traits,”164 which
helps to explain the lack of both empathy and acceptance of
responsibility. CU traits help distinguish adolescents with a
more consistent pattern of antisocial and delinquent behavior.165
The presence of CU traits in juveniles has been related to past
violent offenses in a group of juvenile offenders.166 Those who
exhibit CU traits have been shown to have a greater focus on the
positive aspects of aggression while having less focus on nega-
tive aspects of such aggression.167 Empathy was not directly
related to the propensity for violent behavior in adolescents.
SUPPORT FOR INFLUENCE OF EMPATHY AND ACCEP-
TANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN PRACTICE LITERATURE
There is some research support, discussed previously, for
the relationship between empathy and aggression. The pres-
ence of empathy has been viewed as a protective factor, while
the lack of empathy has been regarded as a risk factor. Some
have suggested that empathy inhibits aggression, as more
empathic individuals have the ability to view situations from
different perspectives.168 Aggressors may vicariously experi-
ence another’s distressed reaction, which could make it less
likely that they would continue to engage in aggressive behav-
ior. Thus, one perspective is that increasing victim empathy
decreases self-serving cognitive distortions (e.g., putting one’s
own needs over that of others and the community), which also
may have the effect of inhibiting aggression and other antiso-
cial behavior.169
While normative development is associated with an increase
in empathy during adolescence, aggressive delinquents have
been found to have delayed or arrested development of empa-
thy.170 One study found a moderate positive relationship
between being able to recognize fearful expressions in others
and the ability to empathize with emotional experiences.171 On
the other hand, it has recently been suggested that empathy
may be understood best in relation to one’s experiences and cir-
cumstances.172 That is, whereas empathy deficits may be part of
the personality structure in a subgroup of chronic, violent ado-
lescent offenders, other juvenile offenders “may be prone, as
any one of us is, to situation-specific empathy failures. . . .”173
Peer groups and other environmental factors influence whether
and to what extent empathy may be displayed.
Although acceptance of responsibility for offending has not
“There is some
research 
support... for the
relationship
between empathy
and aggression.”
28 Court Review - Volume 50 
174. Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Victims as ‘Narrative Critics’: Factors
Influencing Rejoinders and Evaluative Responses to Offenders’
Accounts, 20 SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 691, 691 (1994).
175. Petrucci, supra note 160, at 340.
176. Id. at 350.
177. DeMatteo & Marczyk, supra note 168, at 20–21.
178. See D.A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A
Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis,
28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 374–75 (1990).
179. Andrews et al., supra note 146, at 29.
180. DeMatteo & Marczyk, supra note 163, at 21.
181. Id. at 35.
182. See Cindy C. Cottle et al., The Prediction of Criminal Recidivism in
Juveniles: A Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 367, 369
(2001).
183. Id. at 380.
184. Rolf Loeber et al., The Development of Male Offending: Key Find-
ings From the First Decade of the Pittsburgh Youth Study, 7 STUD.
ON CRIME & CRIME PREVENTION 141, 152–55 (1998).
185. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Youth Vio-
lence: A Report of the Surgeon General (2001), http://
www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/ (discussion of
“Proposed Protective Factors in Childhood and Adolescence”
contained in chapter 4).
been widely studied, related concepts have been discussed. For
instance, in one classification system, several versions of accep-
tance—concessions, excuses, justifications, and refusals—are
seen as types of “accounts.”174 Concessions include the notion
of apology. Apologies can be viewed as a form of accepting
responsibility by acknowledging the violation of a social norm.
The mechanism of how this may decrease aggression or reduce
the probability of recidivism is unknown. It is possible that an
apology can express “moral inferiority,” so if the victim accepts
the apology, there is an equalizing of the status between
offender and victim.175 An obvious limitation is that an offender
may use an apology solely for self-serving reasons (e.g., to mit-
igate a sentence), in which case no genuine acceptance of
responsibility or remorse is present.176
ASSESSMENT OF REOFFENSE RISK AND RISK-RELEVANT
NEED IN JUVENILES
An important goal of juvenile assessment is to gauge a
youth’s risk, needs, and responsivity (RNR) by identifying both
risk and protective factors. Risk factors can be defined as “exter-
nal or internal influences or conditions that are associated with
or predictive of a negative outcome.”177 One commonly used
distinction involving risk factors is static versus dynamic.178
Static risk factors are largely historical and not amenable to
change through planned intervention; they include factors such
as gender, history of abuse, history of antisocial behavior, and
history of offending. Static risk factors contribute important
information for accurately gauging reoffense risk, which in turn
is relevant to the needed intensity of rehabilitation services
(with higher risk individuals needing services of greater inten-
sity).179 Dynamic risk factors (also called criminogenic needs)
can change over time and through planned intervention. Exam-
ples include substance abuse, mental health, educational level,
peer relations, family dysfunction, and use of leisure time. For
instance, if a juvenile has a poor educational history, one appro-
priate focus of rehabilitation would include improving basic
academic skills necessary for responsible living and employ-
ment (e.g., reading, basic math).
A risk/needs assessment also may address what factors may
decrease the risk of reoffending. In contrast to risk factors, such
“protective factors” are generally those “external or internal
influences or conditions that decrease the likelihood of a nega-
tive outcome or enhance the likelihood of a positive out-
come.”180 Examples of protective factors include existing proso-
cial involvement, strong social supports, and favorable motiva-
tion/attitude toward treatment. Having such protective factors
present may increase a youth’s
“responsivity” to treatment.
The “responsivity principle” in
juvenile and correctional reha-
bilitation concerns characteris-
tics that affect a youth’s poten-
tial response to rehabilitation
rather than characteristics
directly related to antisocial
behavior.181
Risk and protective factors
have been extensively studied; some have been shown to be par-
ticularly related to reoffense risk or prevention of antisocial
behavior.182 For instance, research has shown that the strongest
predictors may include a young age at first contact with the law
and young age at commitment.183 However, it is important to
note that there is no single factor that, by itself, is highly predic-
tive of reoffending. As a result, investigators have identified mul-
tiple domains that, taken together, show a reasonably strong
relationship to reoffense risk. These domains will be summa-
rized in the next paragraph. 
Major domains in which risk and protective factors are
assessed include the individual, family, academic/vocational,
peer relations, and community domains. At the individual level,
assessment of intellectual ability, personality, and substance-use
history offer potentially useful information for appraising risk.
For instance, impulsivity/risk-taking behavior, low IQ, and high
levels of negative emotionality (e.g., anger, fear) have been
shown to be associated with higher levels of delinquent behav-
ior.184 An intolerant attitude toward deviant behavior has been
shown to have a significant risk-reducing effect in higher risk
individuals.185 The family domain includes familial/parental
stability—in particular, whether there is a history of neglect or
abuse (physical, sexual, or emotional)—and also the nature and
level of parental involvement. This domain may also reveal sev-
eral protective factors, such as positive adult influences and
whether there is a close relationship with at least one support-
ive adult. In the educational domain, an assessment of achieve-
ment and commitment to school should be made. Beyond aca-
demic achievement, schooling may help youth adapt to the
environment, establish self-esteem, and verbalize conflicts
offering alternative methods to deal with disputes or angry feel-
ings. Peer relations may serve as a risk factor not only when
there are negative peer relations (e.g., friends with arrest histo-
ries, drug abuse histories, risk-taking behaviors) but also if the
youth is socially withdrawn. Social withdrawal and isolation
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may result in increased violent
behavior.186 Finally, the environ-
ment provides another domain
in which risk and protective fac-
tors may be found, namely
socioeconomic status (SES).
Low-income and high-crime
neighborhoods are risk factors
because of the potential expo-
sure to crime and violence. An
evaluation of the community
may also reveal formal or informal support systems beyond the
family.187
The evaluation of these domains and their respective risk
and protective factors is accomplished through examining
records (e.g., school records, juvenile records), the youth’s self-
report, the report of collaterals, and the results of formal test-
ing. Collaterals typically include parents but could also include
school administrators, coaches, ministers, case managers, or
other individuals that are highly familiar with the youth’s his-
tory. The major advantage of having multiple collateral inter-
views, in conjunction with the youth’s self-report, is to broaden
the picture of the youth and assess consistency of reports across
sources. Other areas can be assessed through formal testing of
intellectual abilities, academic achievement, and personality.
Once data are collected, the assessment report summarizes rel-
evant risk and protective factors and offers areas that are
amenable to treatment.  
ROLES OF EMPATHY AND ACCEPTANCE OF 
RESPONSIBILITY IN ASSESSING REOFFENSE RISK AND
RISK-RELEVANT NEEDS IN JUVENILES
Specialized risk/needs tools are commonly used to organize
risk factors and protective factors and to promote empirically
supported risk classification. These tools facilitate structured,
informed decision making that is less subject to idiosyncratic
judgment and individual biases.188 Two such instruments
include the Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inven-
tory189 and the Structured Assessment of Risk Violence in
Youth.190 The YLS/CMI is a standardized instrument that gen-
erally assists in assessing risk, needs, and responsivity in youths
to help formulate a case plan. The SAVRY is a structured risk
assessment tool for use with adolescents that helps in gauging
an adolescent’s risk for future violent behavior. Both tools spec-
ify a series of factors, based on the best available research, to be
assessed. The evaluator rates the severity of each factor, and the
overall risk and needs are determined in light of all the infor-
mation about these relevant factors. 
Risk/needs tools are effective because they identify patterns of
behavior and traits that have been present over an extended
period in an individual’s life. Regarding empathy and acceptance
of responsibility, an evaluator should consider whether an
apparent lack of empathy relates to a single instance (e.g., the
current offense) or whether the deficit is apparent more broadly.
While both are important considerations, the latter has greater
implications regarding one’s future risk for aggressive behavior
or recidivism (see discussion of empirical literature that fol-
lows). In addition, many domains on specialized measures such
as the SAVRY are independent of the circumstances of the instant
offense. This means that much risk-relevant information can be
gathered—and rehabilitative interventions implemented—even
when acknowledgment or acceptance of responsibility in the
instant offense is not made. In a related vein, the presence of a
single risk factor (e.g., lack of empathy on the SAVRY) in the
absence of others would most often lead to the conclusion that
the individual was at low risk for future offending. 
The presence of empathy or acceptance of responsibly would
affect a number of items on the YLS/CMI in the
Personality/Behavior and Attitudes/Orientation domains. In
particular, “Inadequate Guilt Feelings” in the
Personality/Behavior domain is defined as feeling no remorse
when behavior has caused harm to another, not accepting
responsibility for actions, and offering excuses.191 In the Atti-
tudes/Orientation Domain, the “Callous, Little Concern for
Others” item is closest to “empathy”; the assessor would con-
sider evidence of little concern for the feelings or welfare of oth-
ers. Other items in this domain may also be affected by empa-
thy and acceptance of responsibility. These include “Antiso-
cial/Procriminal Attitudes,” in which the values, beliefs, and
rationalizations concerning the crime and victim are taken into
account. The items “Not Seeking Help” and “Actively Rejecting
Help” would be influenced by the youth’s failure to recognize
the need for help and resistance to interventions. 
In the SAVRY, empathy plays a direct role in the “Low Empa-
thy/Remorse” risk factor in the broader Individual/Clinical
domain. This is one of a total of 24 risk factors on this measure.
The manual defines empathy as “the identification, under-
standing, and sharing of another person’s thoughts, feelings,
and intentions.”192 Remorse is defined as “distress arising from
repentance for behavior that has hurt another.”193 Both empa-
thy and acceptance of responsibility would be rated by consid-
ering the broad patterns in the individual’s life. The individual’s
description of the alleged offense could serve as one element
within this broader pattern but would not offer an adequate
basis for rating either empathy or acceptance of responsibility
in the absence of broader (non-offense-related) behavior and
capacities.
Although empathy and acceptance of responsibility (as
reflected by remorse) are limited to one of 24 items on the
SAVRY, these constructs may be related to other items. For
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194. When there is a legal justification for an individual’s declining to
talk about the offense, such as that individual’s being so advised
by counsel on a pretrial or continuing appeal basis, then their
declining to discuss the offense or denying culpability should
not form the basis for a mental health professional’s conclusion
that such an individual lacks empathy or does not accept respon-
sibility. The two influences are inextricably intertwined and sim-
ply cannot be separated until there is no longer a legal strategic
justification for the individual’s declining to discuss the offense.
instance one item is “Negative Attitudes.” Here, an examiner
may look for indications of attitudes and values that condone
violence, or misperceiving the actions of others as being hostile
or aggressive. Another item in which empathy/acceptance of
responsibility may be reflected is “Poor Compliance.” A high
rating on this item may indicate that the youth does not believe
he or she is at risk and cannot appreciate the need for inter-
vention. Having a positive attitude toward intervention is also a
protective factor on the SAVRY and may indicate an acceptance
of responsibility.
Several important conclusions may be drawn regarding these
specialized (empirically supported) measures and their incor-
poration of empathy and acceptance of responsibility. First, the
measures consider multiple domains in yielding final conclu-
sions about risk and needs. These two items are included
within the overall number of items and domains but are suffi-
ciently small in number so that, by themselves, they would not
usually yield a conclusion that an individual was at high risk
even if they reflected significant deficits. Second, both empathy
and acceptance of responsibility are assessed using information
from the person’s life broadly. Their description of the offense is
one aspect from which judgments regarding these items can be
drawn. However, a more stable and accurate estimate would
draw upon information regarding the person’s functioning over
time, across situations, and with different people.194 Third,
deficits in empathy and acceptance of responsibility are often
related to other risk-relevant deficits in an individual. When
this occurs, the broader pattern of deficits becomes apparent,
the rated risk of reoffending is higher, and the risk-relevant
needs are more extensive.
CONCLUSION
The law is unsettled and inconsistent on the issue of com-
pelled self-incrimination for the purpose of assessing risk and
needs in the context of juvenile transfer. Empirical behavioral-
science evidence suggests that empathy and acceptance of
responsibility are modestly related to both risk and needs and
should be assessed as part of forensic mental health evaluations
of juveniles being considered for transfer. Taken together, how-
ever, empathy and acceptance of responsibility constitute only
part of the evidence relevant to assessing need and amenability
to intervention. Moreover, information about empathy and
acceptance of responsibility related directly to the circum-
stances and behavior involved in the alleged offense are an even
smaller piece of the puzzle, as both can be assessed as broader
capacities independent of the alleged offense. Accordingly, the
harm to the assessment’s relevance and reliability from not dis-
cussing the alleged offense appears minimal—while the preju-
dicial harm to the defendant stemming from compelled self-
incrimination in this context may be considerable.
Kirk Heilbrun, Ph.D., is a professor in the
Department of Psychology at Drexel University.
His research and practice interests include foren-
sic mental health assessment, risk assessment
and the treatment of justice-involved individuals
with behavioral health disorders, and diversion.
He can be reached via email at kh33@
drexel.edu. 
Sanjay Shah, Ph.D., is a postdoctoral fellow in
the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral
Sciences at Emory University. His research and
practice interests include forensic mental health
assessment, the neuropsychology of justice-
involved individuals, and competency restora-
tion. He can be reached via email at 
sanjayshah01@gmail.com. 
Elizabeth Foster received her Ph.D. in clinical
psychology in 2013 from Drexel University. She
completed her predoctoral internship at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and she
is currently completing a postdoctoral fellow-
ship in forensic psychology at the University of
Massachusetts Medical School. She can be
reached via email at elizabeth.e.foster@
gmail.com. 
Michael Keesler is a pre-doctoral intern at Uni-
versity of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and a
Ph.D. candidate at Drexel University. His pro-
fessional interests include capital litigation, psy-
chopathy, and neuropsychological assessment.
He can be reached via email at mekeesler@
gmail.com. 
Stephanie Brooks Holliday, Ph.D., is a graduate
of Drexel University whose current research
interests include risk assessment, interventions
for risk reduction, justice-involved veterans, and
neuropsychological functioning in veteran popu-
lations. She can be reached via email at
sfbrooks@gmail.com. 
Court Review - Volume 50 31
